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Abstract. SIP PBX is definitely the alpha and omega of
any IP telephony infrastructure and frequently also
provides other services than those related to VoIP traffic.
These exchanges are, however, very often the target of
attacks by external actors. The article describes a system
that was developed on VSB-TU Ostrava as a testing tool
to verify if the target VoIP PBX is adequately secured and
protected against any real threats. The system tests the
SIP element for several usually occurring attacks and it
compiles evaluation of its overall security on the basis of
successfull or unsuccessfull penetrations. The article
describes the applications and algorithms that are used
by system and the conclusion consists recommendations
and guidelines to ensure effective protection against VoIP
PBX threats. The system is designed as an open-source
web application, thus allowing independent access and is
fully extensible to other test modules.
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1. Introduction
Systems designed to test and monitor networks or other
components are quite wide-spread these days. Examples
of the principle ones are Nessus [1], Retina [2], Snort [3]
and other. The majority of these systems allows for
testing the whole network infrastructures and protocols
used for communication between components. None of
these solutions, however, enables a complex testing of
VoIP infrastructure and SIP servers which are the key and
most vulnerable component of the network. The system
we developed, under a working title SPT (SIP Penetration
Testing), was designed as a penetration tests simulator for
SIP servers. Based on the analysis of intersections, the
person who initiated the testing (“the tester”) receives
feedback  in  the  form  of  test  results,  as  well  as
recommendations on how to mitigate potential security
risks that were discovered. The advantage of this solution
is that the system simulates real attacks from the external
network, i.e. the system does not need to be placed in the
same network as the target component DUT (Device
under Test). This is frequently one of prerequisites to be
able  to  use  other  testing  tools.  The  SPT  system  was
implemented as a web application accessible through a
standard web browser and therefore independent on the
operation system’s platform. Authentication will be done
using the SSO (Single Sign-On) service - Shibboleth [4].
This should also prevent the system being used for other
than testing purposes. Once signed in, the tester enters the
required data into a web form and chooses tests to be run.
The output of the application once the tests have been
completed is an e-mail report to the tester.
This paper contains the results of the tests; and in
case some penetrations were successful it also contains
recommendations and measures to mitigate such attacks
in  the  future.  Figure  1  illustrates  the  concept  of  the  SPT
system. The following chapter describes individual
testing methods in detail, their implementation,
algorithms used and the impact on the target SIP server.
Fig. 1: SIP penetration tests system scheme.
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2. Platforms, Algorithms and their
Time Evaluation
Although the system is primarily designed for penetration
tests on SIP servers, in reality it can perform full-scale
attacks on a particular component and provide feedback
on it to the tester. Thus, it is necessary to ensure that the
developed system cannot be abused by a third party. The
system was designed as a LAMP (Linux, Apache,
MySQL, PHP) server [8] and its complete administration
including the installation is carried out via a web
interface. For reasons stated above, the system will only
be accessible to authorised persons once they pass
through the authentication. First the tester fills in the IP
address or domain name of the central SIP server and the
email address to which the test results will be sent. Using
checkboxes, the tester may define the range of the
modules offered for testing. Individual modules are
described below in detail.
2.1. Scanning and Monitoring Module
In order to be able to carry out an efficient and precise
attack on a SIP server, the potential attacker needs to find
as much information as possible about a particular
component. This is why we first developed a Scanning
and Monitoring (“S&M”) module for the SPT system,
which is used to test the security of the server against
attacks aimed at obtaining information by means of
common and available tools (Fig. 2).
Fig. 2: SPT system – S&M module.
These tools include for instance Nmap [9] or ever
more popular SIPvicious [10]. SPT system also uses these
testing tools. By means of these tools, it is possible to
obtain a list of listening ports or a list of user accounts
created from the unsecure server. Where the server is not
secured sufficiently, they can obtain even the most
important - passwords to individual accounts. If the tester
ticks the test to be carried out, the Nmap application is
used first to establish open ports. Given the time
requirements of the Tn [s] test, the testing is by default
restricted only to several most frequently used ports.
Using the web form, the tester can set the range of the
tested  ports.  However  the  total  time set  for  testing  using
Nmap is 1800 s (30 minutes). The list of available ports is
subsequently included in the assessment report together
with recommendations on how to minimize such ports’
scanning. Another test which the SPT system can carry
out aims at establishing whether SIP server’s security
allows  for  obtaining  a  list  of  user  accounts.  For  this
purpose, SIPvicious is used. By sending out OPTION and
ACK requests, the application detects what accounts are
defined on the SIP server. By default, the system tries the
100-999 range of accounts. Again, the tester may define
own range of tested numbers Enr or import a text file
containing strings of alpha- numeric characters or words
Edr. Time required to check and create a list of Te [s]
accounts can be expressed by Eq. (1) where c = 0,02603
is a time constant obtained by repetitive measurements on
a sample of 1000 potential accounts on different target
SIP servers [7].
cEET drnre ×+= )( . (1)
Number of valid accounts Evalid is derived from
Eq. (2) where Einvalid is the number of accounts that have
been reviewed by the  system but  not  defined on the  SIP
server.
invaliddrnrvalid EEEE -+= )( . (2)
Once the system has tested security of the SIP
server against detecting accounts, possibility to detect
passwords for individual accounts is tested. Again, this
testing  is  carried  out  by SIPvicious. Using a pre-defined
range of possible numeric passwords Pnr or an imported
text file with alpha-numeric characters or words Pdr, it
obtains a list of passwords for individual accounts. Time
requirements on this test are expressed by the following
Eq. (3).
[ ] cPPET drnrvalidp ×+×= )( , (3)
npesm TTTT ++= . (4)
Now we can determine the estimated time
required to carry out the complete S&M test Tsm (4).
Using the module, we can verify whether the target SIP
server is sufficiently secured against such scanning and
monitoring attacks.
2.2. Denial of Service Module
One of the most frequently occurring attacks is DoS
(Denial of Service). In reality, it consists of several
attacks with the same characteristic feature – to lock up
or restrict the availability of the attacked service so that it
does not function properly. Several types of DoSs [11]
can be used to achieve this; our system tests the SIP
server using the most frequently used one, Flood DoS.
The principle of the attack is to send a large volume of
adjusted or otherwise deformed packets to the target
component so that it is unable to provide its core services.
As a result of the attack, CPU load increases and most of
the available bandwidth is consumed, resulting in the SIP
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server being unable to service regular calls, or only a
minimum amount of them. To generate Flood DoS, the
SPT system uses two applications: udpflood [12] and
inviteflood [12]. When using udpflood, the system
generates UDP packets of 1400 bytes which are directed
at SIP default port 5060 of the target SIP server. The
tester defines the number of generated packets and the
system tests whether the packets arrived at the SIP server
and whether they cause some restriction of the service
availability (Fig. 3). Since we know the packet’s size and
therefore also the size of the Ethernet framework Fsudp,
we can, based on the number of generated packets Pn and
the bandwidth provided Bw, determine time Tudp [s]
required to carry out the test (5).
Fig. 3: SPT system - DoS module.
( ) wudpudp BPFsT n /×= . (5)
Table 1 provides an overview of time required for
different numbers of generated packets Pn and different
bandwidth Bw. When the other application, inviteflood, is
used for testing, the system generates INVITE requests at
the SIP server which are directed at an existing account.
This method is very successful as most of today’s SIP
servers require an authentication for INVITE requests. As
the INVITE requests generated by our system do not
contain any authentication string, the SIP server returns
SIP answer 407 Proxy Authentication Required. With the
large volume of incoming requests, the load of SIP
server’s CPU increases. The tester can set the value of a
valid account in the system manually, or it can be
randomly selected from the previously obtained list of
valid accounts Evalid. As in the previous case, we can,
based on the number of generated packets Pn and the
bandwidth provided Bw, determine time Tinvite [s] required
to carry out the test (6).
( ) winviteinvite BPFsT n /×= . (6)
Figure  4  illustrates  the  impact  of  the  change  in
bandwidth on CPU load when simulating an udpflood
attack. The chart also clearly shows resistance of the two
popular open-source SIP servers, Asterisk PBX [5] and
OpenSIPS [6],  to  UDP Flood DoS attacks.  Both  centrals
have been installed on the same HW of Dell PowerEdge
R510 server to eliminate any potential difference in
computational performance. To change bandwidths, we
used HW emulator of the Simena networks. CPU load on
individual centrals was measured by means of dstat [13].
The chart shows that OpenSIPS is many times more
resistant to UDP DoS attacks than Asterisk. Total time
required to carry out DoS tests dosT  is determined as
follows (7).
Tab.1: Udpflood attack time duration with different bandwidth and
number of generated packets.
Number
of packets
- Pn
Bandwidth [Mbit·s-1] and the attack time
Tudp [s]
10 25 50 100
100 000 113,12 45,25 22,63 11,31
200 000 226,24 90,50 45,26 22,62
300 000 339,36 135,75 67,89 33,93
400 000 452,48 181 90,52 45,24
500 000 565,60 226,25 113,15 56,55
600 000 678,72 271,5 135,78 67,86
700 000 791,84 316,75 158,41 79,17
800 000 904,96 362 181,04 90,48
900 000 1018,08 407,25 203,67 101,79
1 000 000 1131,20 452,5 226,3 113,1
inviteudpdos TTT += . (7)
Results and success rate of DoS tests carried out
are included in the report for the tester.
Fig. 4: Impact of change in bandwidth on CPU load in case of
udpflood attack.
2.3. Registration Manipulation Module
Once the potential perpetrator obtains information about
existing accounts, he can manipulate these accounts quite
easily. The SPT system we developed can also test SIP
servers’ security, i.e. measures against manipulating the
registration, see Fig. 5.
Fig. 5: SPT system - RM module.
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To carry out this test, the system uses reghijacker
[12] which substitutes the legitimate account registration
with a fake, non-existing one. This type of attack can
easily be expanded to a so called MITM, Man-in-the-
Middle [11]. In this attack, a non-existent user is
substituted by a valid SIP registration and all incoming
signaling and media to the legitimate registration will be
re-directed to the newly created registration. In this case,
the tester needs to define the value of the SIP account
which is to be stolen in the system and where
authentication of REGISTER request is allowed, also
a password to this account. Where the tester fails to
define these values, the system automatically assigns an
account and its password from the list created while
scanning and monitoring the central. Time required to
carry out the test Trm is insignificant compared to
operational times of other modules.
2.4. SPIT Module
Today, one of the most popular attacks on the Internet is
spam. It is estimated that spams account for 80 – 90 % of
total attacks on the Internet. Security experts predict that
Spam over Internet Telephony (SPIT) will be a major
threat in the future. The level of annoyance is even
greater than with classical spam. Our team had developed
SPITFILE [14] which served as a testing tool while
developing security against such type of attacks. The SPT
system uses the core of this application, together with
Sipp [14],  to  simulate  a  SPIT  attack  on  the  target  SIP
server (Fig. 6). In the form, the tester defines the value of
a valid SIP account – the called party to which the SPIT
call will be directed and then the value and password to a
valid SIP account – the caller through which the call will
be initiated. Where the tester fails to define these values,
the system automatically assigns an account and an
appropriate password from the list created while scanning
and monitoring the central.
Fig. 6: SPT system - SPIT module.
If the attack was successful,  a SIP call is initiated
from  the  caller’s  account,  and  the  end  device  with  the
registered account of the called party starts ringing. Once
the call is answered, a pre-recorded message is played
and the call terminated. Time required to carry out the
test Tspit is determined by the length of the pre-recorded
message. The final report on penetration tests which the
tester receives via e-mail, will, besides information on all
previous tests, also contain an analysis and success rate of
the SPIT module’s test.
Fig. 7: Division of the SPT system into individual modules.
Figure 7 illustrates the division of the SPT system
into individual modules and shows time intervals
necessary to carry out individual tests in respective
modules. Time requirements of the whole SPT system
can be expressed by Eq. (8). Its value depends on many
factors and can radically change in accordance with the
type of tests requested by the tester. Its value is for
reference only.
spitrmdossmspt TTTTT +++= . (8)
3. Platforms, Algorithms and their
Time Evaluation
Although the SPT system is still in the phase of intensive
testing and development, basic operational tests of all
available modules were carried out. Each test is
accompanied by a short description of countermeasure’s
principles and methods [12] which should limit or
completely mitigate potential security gaps that were
revealed during SIP servers’ testing.
Fig. 8: SIP penetration tests system testbed.
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Figure 8 describes the basic testing topology. The
system is denoted as SPT and Asterisk as VoIP PBX.
Asterisk was installed at Dell PowerEdge R510 server.
3.1. Scanning and Monitoring Module
Testing and Countermeasures
The first step was to enter IP address of SIP server and e-
mail  address  to  which  the  report  will  be  sent.  Next,  the
S&M module and subsequently Nmap and SIPvicious
applications were launched. Values for Nmap were set by
default, value of Enr for SIPvicious was  set  to  range
between 1000-9999. The device found all three registered
accounts Evalid 7001-7003 and listed open TCP and UDP
ports at Asterisk. Once Pnr was set to 7001-7003 and a
text file Pdr containing test and 7003ab string, the test to
obtain passwords to individual accounts was also
successful (Fig. 10a). Total time incurred on testing
module is Tsm @  235 s. Part of the report that is delivered
to a tester’s email is shown on Fig. 9. If we had to protect
and prevent SIP server from scanning and monitoring,
then an implementation of firewall is the effective
solution or an intrusion detection system that is able to
distinguish scanning and monitoring. The next effective
solution is to divide the network logical infrastructure
into VLANs and decompose the provided services into
more physical servers (TFTP, HTTP servers). The
prevention of accounts and passwords detection is
difficult, moreover, the tools for detection apply the
standard SIP methods and is not trivial to distinguish
legitimate behaviour from an attack. In this case, it is
recommended to divide the infrastructure into individual
VLANs so that the detection for intruder is as difficult as
possible.
Fig. 9: Example of the SaM module test results that are sent to Tester’s
email.
Fig. 10: SIP penetration tests System testbed. a) scanning and
monitoring tests, b) DoS tests, c) registration manipulation
tests, d) SPIT tests.
3.2. DoS Module Testing and
Countermeasures
Using udpflood, the tester sent 500000 UDP packets
directly to port 5060. Bandwidth was set to 100 Mbit/s,
Asterisk processed 90 % calls. Once the test was
completed, Asterisk recovered to a full operation mode.
To be able to compare, we substituted Asterisk by
OpenSIPS in this test. Call processing under the same
attack was entirely error-free. When testing using
inviteflood on the valid account 7001, we found out that
this attack is much more destructive in terms of
computational power. As early as at 100000 INVITE
request when Tinvite @  9 s, CPU load for both Asterisk
and OpenSIPS reached 100 % and failed to process a
single incoming or outgoing call. Once the test was
completed, both centrals recovered to a full operation
mode (Fig. 10b).
The way how to recognize whether a DoS attack is
successful or not is given below. Before the test starts,
SPT uses the ICMP protocol to measure the average
response time from the exchange - Tavg. During testing
(sending flood packets) the average response - Tdosavg is
again tested in parallel using ICMP. In case that the Tdosavg
is 150 times greater than Tavg,  the  test  is  marked  as
successful. A necessary condition for DoS test is to
support an ICMP protocol. The principle of detection is
shown in Fig. 11.
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Fig. 11: Principle of DoS test detection.
The possibilities on how to protect from Flood
DoS attacks, are the following: to divide the network
infrastructure into separate VLANs, to have in use solely
TLS, to implement L2 network elements with DoS
detection or to apply SIP firewall that can detect DoS
attacks and minimize their impact.
3.3. Registration Manipulation Module
Testing and Countermeasures
When testing possibility for registration manipulation, we
entered values of account 7003 and its password 7003ab
manually  into  the  SPT  system.  Once  the  test  was
completed, we established whether the attack was
successful using the following process. SPT sends a SIP
INVITE message to the test machine. Once a message is
sent, the system waits for the type of response that comes.
Based on this response SPT assess whether the test was
(attack), successful or not. When system receives 180
Ringing response the tested attack has not been
successful, if a 503 Service Unavailable response
arrives, the test was implemented successfully (see
Fig. 12).
Fig. 12: Principle of RM test detection.
The aim of the attack was to de-register account
7003 and to direct all incoming calls to a fake account
which does not exist. Thus, calls were terminated as
unconnected. The call to 7003 was not put through, see
Fig. 10c. The TCP protocol is recommended at transport
level to prevent a registration hijacking because the
manipulation with TCP requires higher complexity. Next
option, how to minimize this threat, is to use REGISTER
message authentication. We could decrease the
registration interval, as well, it is quite simple but
effective.
3.4. SPIT Module Testing and
Countermeasures
As stated above, we used SPITFILE application,
developed  by  authors  of  the  paper,  to  test  the  PBX
vulnerability against SPIT attacks. The tester manually
inserts  value  of  a  valid  account  7002  on  which  a  SPIT
attack was to be initiated, as well as the value of a valid
account 7003 and password to it (7003ab) which was
supposed to initiate the SPIT call. Once the test was
launched, SPITFILE registered on the participant 7003
and then started to generate a call to account 7002. The
end device registered on 7002 began ringing, and once
the call was answered, a recording with an advertisement
was played (Fig. 10d). The system detects the success of
SPIT attacks as follows: during test, SPT monitors the
responses  of  SIP  VoIP  PBX  and  based  on  the  them,
system defines whether the SPIT test was successful or
not. System performs 5 consecutive SPIT calls, and all
INVITE messages must be answered with 180 Ringing
response. If SPT receives any other response, SPIT test
failed. Detection process can be seen in Fig. 13.
Fig. 13: Detection of SPIT test.
A  few  methods  exist  on  how  to  restrict  the  SPIT
propagation, which are more or less efficient, but their
combination bring quite strong protection against the type
of attack. Such methods include various forms of lists or
voice testers based on CAPTCHA which are particularly
effective against caller bots. Authors developed own
solution ANTISPIT [14] that exploits the specific human
behavior and automatically modifies the Blacklist table
without participation of called party, the approach is
based on the statistical Blacklist.
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4. Conclusion and Future Work
The aim of the authors was to develop a tool to carry out
penetration tests on SIP servers. The system that was
designed and implemented consists of several modules
that are able to generate selected types of attacks which
the authors deem most popular. The system then analyses
to what extent is the target component secured, drafts
assessments containing tests’ results and proposes factual
recommendations to ensure security against the threat
concerned. The assessment report is sent as a text
document to an e-mail. The system is currently under
intensive testing. It is planned that in the future, it will be
extended to include other testing modules and functions
such as for instance testing of the whole VoIP
infrastructure and heavy testing of individual
components.
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